The influence of the new monarchy could soon be felt throughout British society, even in unexpected places. Upon becoming King, William took the standing army and navy that James II had begun to build up and expanded and disciplined them until they became significant forces in the European balance of power. In order to assure the throne and to bring Britain into the war against France, William reluctantly accepted the Declaration of Rights and regular sittings of Parliament. The settlement also guaranteed Anglicanism as the state church. William also had to reform the administration of the government and to find new sources of money for his wars.
profoundly, and the creation ofthe Bank ofEngland and the national debt were among the Dutch innovations adopted by the British to underwrite the wars. As it drew Britain directly into the military conflicts on the Continent, William's revolution caused important structural changes in British society.1
Many of the changes affected the medical community of England, among them the growing significance of the military forces in the life of the English nation. William adopted some Dutch methods of administering the armed forces, including reshaping the medical infrastructure of the army and navy. Changes included not only an increase in the size of the medical staff needed for William's military ventures, but also in the organization of the medical services. These reforms affected the practice of military medicine. They created new routes to medical training that affected many practitioners. They also helped to channel the course of institutional conflict in the London metropolis. Additionally, the new military establishment reinforced the growing cachet of empirical, practical, "clinical" medicine, undermining the ideas of medical judgement held dear by the learned physicians.
Military medical practitioners were often only cursorily trained in medical practice. They also dealt with large numbers of men at once, not individual patients. Such practitioners had little time or inclination to become deeply learned in physic, which sought the causes of ever-changing disease states in the unique physiological conditions of each person's constitution. Rather, they preferred to sort out cases according to symptoms based upon the "ontological" theories that diseases were specific entities that could be readily identified and classified. When it came to treatment, military medical practitioners also sought specific cures that would attack and conquer specific disease entities rather than the varying treatments, oriented to the varying states of a protean distemper, preferred by the learned physicians. Certainty and uniformity in the diagnosis of specific complaints could provide the basis for uniform and specific treatments in medicine and surgery.
Military medicine therefore inculcated the highest respect for a knowledge of specific details that could be quickly taught to others, rather than well-informed judgement rooted in good character. It was a medicine that often held up the methods of Thomas Sydenham as an ideal, the methods of someone who himself had seen military service. Whether the practices we shall look at below were truly Sydenhamian or not, many of the proponents of new treatments pointed to him as their model in order tojustify the importance ofan empirically or "experimentally" derived system of treatment that would be good for all patients whomsoever.
The advantages ofempirical medicine for the military surgeons and physicians were many: the more regularized and standardized each step of diagnosis and treatment became, the easier it would be to treat soldiers and sailors, to 107 below. their men back in shape to perform their duties as quickly, efficiently, and cheaply as possible. As for the sick and wounded soldiers and sailors themselves, they had even less choice over which practitioner to call on or which treatments they would receive than the poor people who resorted to hospital care. In short, military medicine combined surgery and medicine and was oriented towards a mass clientele, based upon the power of practitioner over patient, directed toward quick and simple cures, and rooted in a belief in specific disease entities rather than unique physiological imbalances. Military medicine combined just those aspects of medicine to which historians have often pointed when tracing the origins of modern medicine.
THE REVOLUTION AND MILITARY MEDICINE
Gaining the loyalty and restoring the strength ofthe English armed forces was one of the first needs ofthe new soldier-king William III. He strove to raise new and powerful forces to defeat the army of the deposed James Stuart in Ireland in 1689 and 1690, to continue his struggle against the French in Flanders until 1697, and to deploy fleets on expeditions in the Irish Sea, the Channel, the Mediterranean, and the West Indies. After his conquest, William quickly had to restore, increase and reshape the British army and navy, both to ensure their loyalty to the new order and to increase their size and power.
William soon found that, in order to make his new forces more battle-worthy, he had to revamp the military medical services along lines more like those in the Dutch army and navy. An Englishman experienced in the Irish wars, Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery, had earlier written of the importance of having a "competent" medical staff and hospital in all garrisons, "for besides the just Charity of such Care, who can expect the Soldiery shall frankly hazard themselves, ifdue provision be not made for the wounded and sick ... .?"3 By the end of William's wars, the English Secretary to the Navy Board had learned harder lessons than the usefulness of medical preparations for morale. When Josiah Burchett wrote of the government's duty to provide for the medical care of the men obtained for service, he, too, wrote that such care "will much contribute ... to the confirming in them a hearty Love and Affection to the Publick Service." But equally importantly, the larger forces of the day had been hard to maintain in strength, given the rate of sickness among the soldiers and especially among the sailors: hence, "there cannot be too much Care taken to preserve a Race of Men so absolutely necessary for the Good of our Country."4 Without sufficient manpower, Britain's armed forces would be ofno use; and one could not raise and train men quickly enough to replenish the swelling forces if many of those in service perished of disease.
The soldiers and sailors ran much greater risks ofdying ofdisease than ofwounding, maiming, or death in battle. They lived in cramped and dirty quarters or in the open air, subject to the weather, elbow to elbow with their fellows, on inadequate and commonly bad, even inedible, rations. Scurvy, diseases of the lungs and bowels, and fevers of all kinds raged among the men, incapacitating many of those who did not perish. In September 1690, for instance, William's commander in Ireland, Count Solms, reported that there were far more sick in his forces than could be taken care of, with one regiment having not even ten men able to stand at arms.5 During the 1693 expedition to the West Indies, the attack on Martinique had to be abandoned because of sickness among the troops; the 1695 expedition to the same region lost so many men to disease that several severely undermanned ships went down at sea before they could get home.6
By the beginning of the new reign, the British were accustomed to expect that each regiment and ship would have a surgeon and one or two surgeon's mates to take care of the sick as well as the wounded.7 But, during wartime, these practitioners often could not provide enough care for the sick and wounded. Shortly after the Battle of Bantry Bay on 1 May 1690, Admiral Herbert gave a speech about the inadequacy of medical provision in the navy.8 Parliament had decided to revive during the new conflict the system of supplemental relief that had become common since the Civil War, appointing a six-member Commission for the Sick ship for the fleet; two more were hired in 1691, and from 1693 to the end of the war there were never fewer than five in service. 35 In many respects, the new medical establishment resembled that of the Dutch. In The Netherlands, each of the five Admiralty Colleges into which the Republic was divided had long had the assistance of well-paid and experienced physicians and surgeons who advised on the medical preparations and care of each fleet and examined the surgeons who applied for the remunerative posts aboard the men-ofwar. The Admiralty Colleges also employed surgeons in the home ports. The Dutch armies had surgeons and surgeon's mates for the regiments, and Physicians and Surgeons General supervising the medical care of each army overall, including undertaking examinations of the surgical staff.36 It was a system that William had found useful; and while Charles II's and James II's military reforms had already begun to adopt some of these modern methods, the Revolution forced rapid change.
Perhaps just as important as the changes in the military's medical administration was the expansion of the size of the army and navy during William's wars. With every ship and regiment having its own surgeons and surgeon's mates, and with the rapid increase in the overall number of ships and regiments, the number of British medical practitioners with military experience grew quickly. There were not only many more places to fill, there was a rapid turnover in medical manpower as well, especially in the navy, where the surgeons ranked among the warrant-officers and contracted individually for each voyage. The naval physician William Cockburn estimated that as many as one-half the surgeons in the navy each year were novices.37 Surgeon General Van Loon first tried to solve the problem by impressment; Josiah Burchett later suggested that increasing the surgeon's pay yet further or putting them on a yearly salary might help "to invite knowing Men to undertake this Employment".38
But there were some attractions to the service for practitioners just starting out in the world and willing to endure the hardships and risks of military life. Military surgeons gained personal contacts with men and officers who might later help introduce them into civilian practice. Military employment also provided a means of avoiding the civilian infrastructure that otherwise dominated urban medical practice: when army and navy officers thought it necessary, surgeon's mates could be promoted to surgeon without having fulfilled any of the requirements ordinarily established for masters by the guilds. Many surgeons also took advantage of the Act of 1698 that allowed all discharged "soldiers" to practise their trades regardless of guild rules.39 Therefore, when former military men moved into civilian practice, they often had little patience with the established medical corporations or with their 35 Ehrman, op. cit., note 27 above, pp. 445-6; J. J. Sutherland Shaw, 'The hospital ship, 1608 Given the military needs of the defence of the Revolution, it is not surprising to find that after 1688 the Crown began not only to reform military medical institutions but also to adapt the established civilian medical corporations to its purposes. In doing so, it helped to reshape the medical community of London. Among the medical institutions there was the London College of Physicians, which had notions of regulating all medical practice in and around the city so as to make its standards the de facto measure of good practice in England. The officers of the College had been encouraged by the previous regime to act vigorously against anyone and everyone who practised badly or without their permission. But gradually the new regime and the College developed important differences, not least about the content of medicine. While at first the Crown and the London College of Physicians co-operated in efforts to provide medical care to the armed forces, they soon had a falling out, which weakened the authority of the learned physicians of London.
As the country's military needs became ever more apparent, the King turned to the College of Physicians for help. Its In addition to requests from the army, the College also received requests from the Lords of the Admiralty. In March 1692, the Lords wrote that Peter Gelsthorp had resigned as physician at Deal. They wished to know if Robert Conny was a capable physician, to which the College responded affirmatively.5' Not long after, Queen Mary directed a letter to the College stating that she intended to send an expedition to the West Indies soon, and asking its advice on an able physician. The College recommended William Grimbalston to the ill-fated expedition.52 The Queen then asked the College to consult with Grimbalston and to recommend jointly an apothecary and assistant to the forces, and the kinds and quantitites of medicines to be sent on the expedition; it obliged.53 When plans were set afoot to reform the navy medical system, and establish the positions of physicians to the fleet or yard, the Crown also asked for the College's advice on whom to appoint.
Yet the College soon found that co-operation with the Crown in the matter of recommending physicians for naval service undermined rather than strengthened its privileges. At the end of December 1692, the Lords of the Admiralty asked the College for a list of three or four nominations for a physician to take care of the sick and wounded at Portsmouth, from which they would choose one. This arrangement would have placed the final decision of who should serve in the hands of the Admiralty rather than the College. After some debate, the College officers decided that "to recommend so many", from which only one would be chosen, "might be a prejudice to their Majesties affairs by discouraging fitt, and able Physicians from proffering themselves for the future". In the matter of supplying medicines for the armed forces, too, the officers of the College found that co-operation with the new government had become a Trojan Horse. The College began by energetically obliging the military, but it soon found that it had set in motion a project that it could not control. There had been problems with the 1691 batch of drugs sent to the army, and the Society of Apothecaries seized its opportunity. Early in the next year, the officers of the College found that they had not even been notified of preparations for making up a new supply of medicines for the army by apothecaries at the Savoy. The inspection of all drugs made up by apothecaries being a jealously guarded right of the College physicians, they wrote to Physician General Hutton to suggest that they should be brought in on the matter. Hutton replied that he was "morally sure" that nothing was being done by contract between "the publick and the Apothecaries ... that does in any manner touch or can lessen our [physicians'] privileges". But the justification he gave for saying so was weak: the drugs were being made up in a public laboratory that was open to any qualified person's inspection (rather than being under the direction of the College alone); there was a pressing need for medicines for the army (which seemed no reason to leave the College out); "and it would be thought a hardship upon the publick if his Majesty should not be allowed the freedom to lay his commands on one or more of his own domestick attendants and those of your number" to inspect them. In short, Hutton meant no harm to the College, but the government had to get on with the war without being bothered about corporate niceties. It would contract with whomever it pleased.
Standing on their prerogatives, the officers of the College insisted that in order to serve His Majesty and the public as they would like, they required timely notice to view the drugs "before they be mingled, as well as the Compositions themselves when fully made up, for want of which (by the fault of some we shall not now mention) we could not bee so answerable for many of the Medicines the last yeare, as we could on the preceding one." Hutton answered that he would tell the apothecaries to give the College notice of when they were preparing the army's medicines; and the physicians did inspect the laboratory twice in March.57 Yet the meaning of these events was clear: the armed forces needed a good supply of medicines for the troops, and they wished to obtain it as efficiently as possible, contracting with suppliers themselves rather than going through intermediaries who were tetchy about the proper relationships between medical practitioners. The College had lost the right to inspect, much less supply, the huge quantities of drugs needed by the army and navy.58 Clearly, the officers of the College and the Lords of the Admiralty had different formulations of the underlying problem. The College thought that the proper question should be how to ensure the supply of wholesome drugs; for Their Lordships, the issue was the supply of medicines that would work to cure the diseases suffered by the sailors. As the meeting continued, it became plain to the officers of the College that Their Lordships wanted specific medicines, the kind of medicines the physicians associated with quackery: good for a specific disease in all cases whatsoever, no matter what the age, temperament, or circumstances of the patient. For their part, the learned physicians believed that no disease was precisely the same in every patient, and that consequently patients had to be treated individually, with the drugs varied according to the gender, age, and circumstances of the patient and the precise moment at which the ever-changing manifestations of the illness was found. To the Admiralty Lords, the approach of the learned physicians might be fine for well-to-do patients with money to spend and time to recuperate, but it would not do on board military vessels, where all common sailors were treated alike and where quick cures were needed to get them back on the job.
In the course of the argument, the officers of the College told Their Lordships that "they humbly conceived, that making a bald envoice" of specific drugs good in all cases for specific diseases "would be of no service or use to attain the ends their Lordships aimed att". Rather, they insisted that in discharging "their Duty, as became them, whom the laws of the land had intirely and most properly trusted with the care, and inspection of Medicines", they would give Their Lordships "the best information they could, of the wayes and methods most proper in this case" to ensure 1694-1716, fols. 171, 174-5, 180-1. From 1703 on, the Society of Apothecaries, through its "Navy Stock Company", supplied all the surgeons' chests: Keevil, op. cit., note 8 above, pp. 272-5. 59 Annals, VII, 6-7. that uncorrupted medicines were supplied. But Captain Preutiman blew up, replying angrily that all they wanted was an invoice of efficacious drugs. The President tried to mollify him by saying that they were there to serve His Majesty. Therefore, where might the ships be going? One had to know in order to make out a list of drugs appropriate for the climate. Sir Robert Rich, however, said, "an Envoice for 200 men was an Envoice, and a fever was a fever all the world over". The physicians' reply, that different places and climates had different diseases, brought the interview to an end. Their Lordships were getting nowhere, and dismissed the physicians.60
Conflicting interests made co-operation between the College physicians and the armed services increasingly difficult, if not impossible. When the Admiralty decided to ask the College one last time for its recommendation of four physicians in January 1697, the College took no trouble. The officers asked the members present in a meeting if anyone was interested; Joseph Gaylard and John Woolaston, both young physicians with Dutch degrees, volunteered and the officers sent up only these two names.61 Not unexpectedly, neither nominee was chosen, and their rejection in favour of Dr Mitchel was announced in one of the London newspapers.62
The military leadership and the officers of the College of Physicians clearly had different institutional goals. The military wanted simple and efficient medical services to keep the troops healthy; the College wanted to become a part of the new governmental system in order to gain more authority over its surgical and pharmaceutical rivals-something that would have made the system of military supply less efficient. Moreover, a crucial difference in attitudes toward medicine itself divided the two groups. The military wanted quick and efficacious cures for specific diseases that would be good for any soldier or sailor in any circumstances, while the learned physicians wished to maintain the importance of learned physic, with its emphasis on the individual.63 The growing interest of the British military establishment in curative medicine further legitimized the increasingly respectable medical empiricism.
THE MILITARY AND THE PROMOTION OF MEDICAL EMPIRICISM
The encouragement given to medical empiricism by the anned forces went beyond general principles, beyond creating institutional conflicts. For the military practitioners themselves, anything that would promote quick diagnoses and easy treatments was heartily welcomed. The demands of their work were great during the many periods of rampant illness or, less frequently, after battles. For their part, the admirals and generals to whom the practitioners were responsible welcomed medical practices that could be communicated according to clear and uniform rules that promised quick, cheap, easily administered, and efficacious cures to get their troops 60 Annals, VII, 7-8; the length of this report written into the College Annals is unusual, and demonstrates that the officers placed great importance on this meeting. 61 Chemistry still figured in the practice promoted by military practitioners of the end of the century. But Thomas Sydenham's "clinical" medicine provided the foundations for the new "practical" men: one observed cases closely and kept notes, identified the specific diseases as ontological entities on the basis of signs and symptoms in the same way that one identified plants from their appearances, wrote up the notes into rules, and systematically noted the effects of different therapies. For many military practitioners, this natural-historical approach to medicine provided a secure foundation for rules of diagnosis and therapy; in combination with laboratory experiments it also promised, they believed, a precise way to develop medical specifics 64 In addition to keeping their manpower healthy and establishing a system that would make it as easy as possible for inexperienced practitioners to treat the sick, the military leaders had to worry about the costs of medicines for the troops. In 1696, for instance, it was reported that the accounts for the "physick" for the army and hospitals was about £8,000 in that could be easily administered and get excellent results in all cases of a disease no matter to whom it was given. The new and larger army and navy after 1688 offered strong and explicit encouragement to medical practitioners who claimed to offer new and effective medical treatments for the sick and wounded. King William himself gave his blessing to some experimental trials of new medicines in order to see if they would be of use. Military service served not only as a training ground for medical practitioners, but also to inculcate in them certain medical values.
One of the most public examples of the military interest in medical specifics was an experiment for the army concerning a new treatment for wounds developed by John Colbatch. According to his own testimony, Colbatch had been apprenticed as an apothecary in Worcester; convinced of the crucial importance of the apothecary's knowledge and skill for medical practice but also aware of his master's defects, he studied hard in medical books while training for his future trade. After becoming a master apothecary, he built up a considerable local business. But he also worked to develop new medicines based upon his own reading and experiment. In the early 1690s, he moved from Worcester to London, to try his fortune.67 Eventually he became one of the great medical practitioners there: a licentiate of the College of Physicians from 1696, he was knighted by George I in 1716.
Colbatch's simple chemical experiments with drugs in his laboratory and his equally crude but numerous experiments on "dogs and other animals" (he claimed to have performed over 100) had caused him to "light upon" several new medicines.68 Two of them, both powders, had surgical applications: his "Tincture of the Sulphur of Venus" was internal; and the "Vulnerary Powder", named after one of Sir Kenelm Digby's remedies, was external. The latter, after being dissolved in water (or, if that was unavailable, in urine) was to be applied to the surface of the wound and squeezed or injected into it, and the lips of the wound stitched together; at the same time, the internal medicine was to be taken dissolved in wine.69 The Vulnerary Powder could stop bleeding almost immediately, even in very bad wounds, without the application of a tourniquet; and by helping the nutriment of the body restore the flesh, it brought about painless cures, even in the body cavity, in a matter of days.70 Colbatch was not unusual in believing that nature would eventually heal the body herself, "if she were not hindered, but assisted".7' While the common surgical remedies (such as suppuration, low diet, and tenting) operated against nature,72 he argued, his powders aided her. Needless to say, new medicines of great usefulness in surgery would be valuable during war, and he brought his medicines to the attention of the King. 67 John Colbatch, A physico-medical essay, concerning alkaly and acid, London, 1696, Preface; the surgeon William Cowper mentioned in passing that Colbatch's advertisements for his "Vulnerary Powder" (on which, see below) were being widely circulated in London at the end of 1693: Cowper, ' The new King had already shown that he would promote promising new medicines. In May 1689 he had granted the right to sell an antidote against poison "from any stage in any city or town" to Cornelius 'a Tilbourne, since he had "made experiment of the virtue" of the antidote, "to the general satisfaction";73 and in February 1692 the King received a report from the Earl of Nottingham on a beer that Sir Brian Broughton believed cured "green wounds". In the latter case, William wanted some of the liquor sent along so that "an experiment" could be made of it before "some further resolution" would be taken with regard to it.74
When Colbatch came to London, his remedies met with suspicion and scepticism from practitioners in London, especially the established surgeons. Nevertheless, given William's willingness to experiment with new remedies, Colbatch gained the right to try out his medicines on some soldiers in Lord Cutts's regiment of the Coldstream Guards.75 Unfortunately, three of his experiments "miscarried". Colbatch blamed two of the three failures on the soldiers being poisoned "after the danger" from their wounds "was over". In another case, a soldier in the experiment died. After five days of Colbatch's watching over the patient day and night "for fear of Roguery", the soldier had become free of "all ill symptoms", and had become "almost well". Unfortunately, according to Colbatch, he was then left alone for four or five hours, during which time someone got him drink; he died an hour or two after Colbatch's return. "My failing in these last Experiments, I suppose, was the Reason I was not then employed by His Majesty" for the Flanders campaign.76 According to the report on these experiments in the Philosophical Transactions, by Mr Cowper, Colbatch's external remedy was nothing but a caustic to stop the bleeding, a view Colbatch vehemently denied.77
Undeterred, however, in May 1694 Colbatch applied for and received a pass from the government to go with two servants to Holland for the summer campaign, to try yet again to prove the efficacy of his remedies.78 He had invested a large amount of money in making up a batch of his medicines to take with him.79 Colbatch had 73 Cal. St. Papers, Dom., 1689-90, op. cit., note 19 above, p. 111. In December 1692 the College of Physicians ordered that several people, including "Tilburn", who was advertising widely, be summoned to account for practising without their licence; but in January "Tilbum ... sent word, the Censors might doe what they please, [he] valued them not." (Annals, VI, 38, 48-50). In June 1693, the College ordered that "Tilburn" be sued for illicit practice (Annals, VI, 70-1). In 1696 the College again heard testimony against "Cornelius a Tilburg", this time for malpractice, one Mr Andrew Brinches claiming that his eyesight had been lost through Tilburg's "ill management" (Annals, VII, 24, 25, 26, 27 evidently gained the favour of Major-General Sir Henry Bellasis: the King issued a general order requiring reports of wounded men to be brought to Colbatch's "most worthy Friend" the General, so that trials could be made.80 According to Colbatch, this time "thanks to God, amongst the great number of Patients I had, there was none but one that miscarried."'8' Colbatch also played on the King's curiosity about medical experiments by taking the unusual step of dedicating his report on his successes to His Majesty, whom he thanked for his "good Wishes".82
His success was not complete, however, for many surgeons refused to countenance Colbatch or his methods. He wrote that their jealousy was so great that he was even publicly threatened with his life. Subsequently he and two friends were "secretly Poysoned": one died, and Colbatch and his other friend barely escaped death. 83 In the early months of 1695, after his return to London,84 some of the London surgeons, led by Charles Bernard, organized their own test of his Vulnerary Powder on a patient undergoing an amputation at St Bartholomew's Hospital. Several surgeons used this failure as the centrepiece of a published attack on Colbatch.85 When Colbatch published a rebuttal, Bernard, a very well-respected London surgeon, wrote to Colbatch expressing his "surprize" at the reasons he gave to explain the result. While Bernard said that he wished very much to have the remedy succeed, "it looks very much like a jest that a medicine designed for universal use, and generally to be used in a hurry should be capable of being artificially or successfully applyd but by one man", that is, Colbatch move into the practice of physic. It was during the siege of Namur that he wrote the draft of his book on using acid remedies rather than alkaline ones to cure diseases,97 a book that was to get the physicians as stirred up against him as the surgeons had been.98 Despite the disapproval of many of the learned physicians, Colbatch had accumulated so many friends in high places that they found it impossible not to make him a licentiate of the College when he applied in 1696;99 his knighthood has already been mentioned.°°H ere was a medical empiric, using all the techniques of self-advertisement at his disposal to make a fortune based upon a purported treatment for wounds (and later for all diseases) that the established surgeons and physicians thought fraudulent. He announced to the world that he was a practical and "experimental" physician, rather than a man learned in books. Within the medical community, only other physicians who despised the medical establishment such as John Radcliffe, In Cockburn, the Lords of the Admiralty found a physician who believed in simplifying and codifying medical methods with a view to developing new and certain cures. As Physician to the Blue Squadron he closely observed and kept a detailed account of the cases of sickness he encountered, following the Sydenham method. These observations, with his views on subjects like victualing, scurvy, the diet and lodging of seamen, fevers, diseases "nearer and under the line", and chemical medicine, were published after his first year in the service in a book dedicated to the Lords of the Admiralty.109 Cockbum oriented all this work toward finding cures for the diseases incident to seamen. A book published the next year followed up by trying to set out rules for precisely describing and treating fevers in such a manner that anyone, even inexperienced surgeons, could successfully cure any cases, including very dangerous ones, by bleeding the precise amount necessary and no more.110 The books together went through two more editions in English" and one in Dutch,112 which Cockburn claimed had been required by the Dutch government to be provided to every surgeon aboard their ships."13 But in addition to his rules for curing fever cases, even in the first book Cockburn mentioned a new "powder" he used to cure cases of looseness. Various kinds of looseness often accompanied fevers aboard ship and could be of grave consequence, especially dysentery. A remedy would be a very important advance in military medicine, especially if it could be given in the form of a simple specific to any sick sailor and get quick and easy cures. Cockburn Although the Admiralty's support for specific medicines and the "quackery" associated with them in the minds of the learned physicians had already created a split between it and the College of Physicians, the Admiralty tried once more to get the learned physicians on board. In the spring of 1700, they asked the College to comment on Cockburn's new suggestion to have all naval surgeons record on a schematic chart the precise symptoms of the dangerous fevers in the West Indies, and the effects of the remedies he proposed, in order to gain a more exact understanding of the disease and its cure.122 The College delegated the elderly and very learned Walter Charleton to look into Cockburn's proposal and to draft the reply. He concluded that "the Experientes and observations brought by the Dr. as the sole Ground, upon which he builds his new Method of treating the sick, seems to us neither authentick enough to engage our Belief, nor Consistent with those made by other physicians in the same Countries." Charleton explained that Cockburn's experiments and observations were "not authentick because not made by the Dr. himselfe, but collected from the relations of others, not physicians" but surgeons. Nor were Cockburn's proposals consistent "with the Reports of others", either "the printed Testimonies of Learned foreigners, who have expressly written of the same subject", or the testimony of "one of our own Fellowes" who had lived in Jamaica-probably Hans Sloane. The College therefore recommended that, instead of trying to find specifics, the Admiralty would be better advised to exercise "a prudent Choice" of "learned and expert Physicians" for the fleet, to treat the sick "according to the most approved Method of Healing now in use among us", and to make sure the sick had a "Convenient diet, clean Lodging, and diligent attendants". 123
Once again, the learned physicians argued that the Admiralty should place their faith in learned men whose judgement could be trusted, rather than innovations derived from the reports of self-interested or unlearned men like Cockburn and the surgeons. When asked, the College examined Cockburn's proposal by having one of 11 Ibid., sigs. A5-A5v. its elder members examine books, written reports, and physicians who had not been in the West Indies for many years. But Their Lordships continued to be excited about the possibilities of simple, easily administered medicines that would provide sure cures for specific diseases, and wanted these investigated. In 1701, they purchased a large quantity of Moses Stringer's specific for the cure of fevers and scurvy, and subjected it to field trials on a naval expedition to the West Indies.'24 William and his admirals and generals went their own way, encouraging those who held out hope of new, efficacious, and specific medicines. The learned physicians and the new regime continued on their collision course.
As for Cockburn, his specific brought him fortune as well as renown, being advertised even after his death.'25 The book he published after the war on the nature, causes, and cure of the four kinds of loosenesses (diarrhoea, lientery, coeliac passion, and dysentery) went through several editions.'26 He wrote against the learned physicians' views of medical practice.127 And he continued to have friends and patients among the nobility and highest officers of the armed forces.128 CONCLUSION The restructuring of the British military medical establishment meant two things for civilian medicine: a new career structure for practitioners, and a reinforced legitimacy for medical specifics. In the long run, a trusted and influential medical corps would provide a crucial framework for investigations into public hygiene as well as "clinical" problems. Peter Mathias has shown how problems affecting the supply of manpower increasingly became the subjects of medical investigation; and how the gradual development of solutions to the many problems of military hygiene led directly to later developments in civilian public health.129 But although the new administrative system for the medical services in his armed forces provided the foundations for these later developments, in William's reign the military's chief interest was in immediate cures for wounds and diseases. It was an age enthusiastic about specifics.
The kinds of medical practitioners and institutions the new monarchs encouraged or failed to encouraged show that they themselves had little interest in physicians who claimed to be superior to other practitioners on the grounds of learning alone. This seems to have been policy built on personal sympathy, for William survived and conquered by giving close attention to ends and means, not general theories. One historian has called William a political "empiricist", perhaps a more significant characterization than he realized.130 Military medicine under William and Mary exhibited a strong tendency to reward medical specifics rather than personal dignity and leamed philosophy, those with a reputation for having healing skill or new therapies as opposed to Oxford and Cambridge educations. Thus, the growing weight of the military forces during William's reign played an important role in spreading trained medical practitioners around England. But equally significant is the kind of medical skill encouraged by the armed services: it was curative knowledge based upon direct experience and of immediate benefit, with the same practice good for anyone rather than tailored to unique individuals, precisely that kind of empirical medicine for which the eighteenth century is known. The medical infrastructure created to wage William's wars strongly promoted a more universalistic and empirical, less individualistic and learned, medicine. In France, too, military events later led to similar developments.'31
It is not that the militarization of Britain after 1688 alone created the conditions in which this kind of medical practice developed: the story is far more complicated. The movement of medicine in a "clinical" direction and the "rise of the surgeons" also occurred elsewhere and had many causes, not least the developments of the market economy and the changing role of the hospital. Like these other changes, the transformation of medicine at the end of the seventeenth century had its roots in previous decades; but like them, too, the new settlement institutionalized laissez-faire commercialism and helped to establish a new medical orthodoxy that lasted well into the nineteenth century. In addition to the constitutional and financial changes for which the Glorious Revolution is celebrated, 1688-89 brought changes to British medicine, setting practical Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Dutchmen against the dignified Anglican establishment.
